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INTRODUCTION
One aspect of the problem in trying to align a corporate investment
horizon (the time period for return on investment) to that of its
shareholders is the enormous range of investor time horizons, which can
range from milliseconds to centuries. Flash (high-frequency) traders hold
shares for milliseconds, day traders for a few hours or days, some mutual
funds and other institutional investors show a holding period limited to a
few months to a year, and private equity and most mutual funds seem
generally limited to three to five years. Beyond that, some actively
managed mutual funds may be up to ten years, as evidenced by turnover
ratios. Passively-managed index funds are oblivious to time periods,
leaving that decision entirely to the index makers, which might range from
a year or so for shifting indices like small cap value versus small cap
growth sectors to total market indices that have few changes over ten to
thirty years or longer. University endowments may have a century-length
horizon.1 Whose horizon controls? Should officers and directors be
obliged to make decisions that will increase shareholder value (i.e. stock
price) today or this week or this quarter or this year or this decade or this
century or somehow weigh the various shareholders’ diverse interests in
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College of Law (secondary appointment).
** Professor and Director of the Reiman School of Finance University of Denver, Daniels College of
Business.
1. DAVID F. SWENSEN, PIONEERING PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, AN UNCONVENTIONAL
APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 2 (2000) [hereinafter SWENSEN, PIONEERING PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT].
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some weighted period pro rata to those interests? Besides, the beneficial
owner of those shares is often very far removed from the actual owner,2 as
with 401(k) investors owning mutual funds through their employerprovided plans, held by trustees, recorded by institutional record keepers,
managed by mutual funds managers under contract to the fund companies,
with the actual securities held by custodian banks (and even then stock
shares may be loaned to other investors). The chain of nominal owner to
title holder to custodian to equitable owner is quite long.
A second aspect of the problem is whether ownership of shares
equates to ownership of the corporation. Does a corporation actually have
owners or need owners?3 Stockholders are presumed to own the company;
this is certainly so for closely-held corporations where ownership and
management are co-existent,4 but it is rather doubtful for publicly-traded
corporations (also called “entrepreneurial” and “managerial”).5 Berle and
Means elucidated, the widely-dispersed ownership of shares in the modern
corporation creates a separation between ownership and management
(control) in which “the shareholder . . . has surrendered a set of definite
rights for a set of indefinite expectations.”6 Thus, shareholders have
“interests” “in the form of distributions and what appraisal an open market
will make of these expectations.”7 Interests are not the same as ownership.
Consequently, for publicly-traded companies, a share certificate does not
actually convey ownership of the corporation. Berle and Means long ago
stated this, quoting from an earlier writer:

2. Joseph L. Bower & Lynn S. Paine, The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership, 95 HARV.
BUS. REV. 50, 53 (2017).
3. E.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, Like a Fish Needs a Bicycle: Public Corporations and Their
Shareholders, 65 MD. L. REV. 538, 538–39 (2006).
4. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 70 (1933). Berle made the distinction sharper in a later article:
[P]roperty has now split into two distinct categories. One class may be called active — the
farm, the little business, the collection of tangible property which the owner can himself
possess, manage, and deal with. The other may be called passive — a set of economic
expectations evidenced by a stock certificate or a bond, each representing an infinitesimal
claim on massed industrial wealth and funneled income-stream. The owner of passive
property is helpless to do anything with it or about it, except to sell for what the security
markets will let him have.
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1369–70 (1932) (footnotes omitted).
5. See, e.g., MICHEL AGLIETTA & ANTOINE REBÉRIOUX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADRIFT, A
CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 35 (2005); William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory
of the Firm: Critical Perspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475–76, 1494 (1989).
6. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 277, 287.
7. Id. at 170, 286–87.
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No one is a permanent owner. The composition of the
thousandfold complex which functions as lord of the
undertaking is in a state of flux. . . . The claims to
ownership are subdivided in such a fashion, and are so
mobile, that the enterprise assumes an independent life, as
if it belonged to no one . . . . 8
Share classes that give extra weight to certain classes, such as newer
technology and media companies that are still owned and managed by the
founders or their scions, are a different species of corporate ownership
closer to privately-held founder-led companies than the widely-dispersed
shareholders of the Berle and Means modern corporation model.
A third aspect of the problem is that, despite the theories and
advocacy of shareholders being owners, based on the agency model of
corporate finance first developed in the 1970s, the theory is contrary to
corporate law. As we explain below, those theories were based on a
theoretical assumption—actually a fiction—that shareholders owned the
corporation because this fit the agency theory. After all, if there is an agent
(management), then there must be a principal (shareholders). Even Berle
and Means relied on that fiction (and invented it) for a different reason
than Michael Jensen and others later did. But long-standing corporate law,
unchanged even during the agency model heydays, gives no such role to
the shareholders, and the directors are not agents of the shareholders but
are fiduciaries to the corporation itself, in effect making the corporation a
conservatorship as far as the directors’ duties to put the corporation’s
interest foremost.
These three aspects will be developed in this Article to urge that the
question of investor time horizons should be largely irrelevant to the
corporate investment decisions for publicly-traded corporations. Instead,
directors should abide by their corporate-law mandated fiduciary duties to
invest and manage the company in the company’s own best interest. This
looks more like a conservatorship of the corporation itself and less like a
principal–agent relationship. The conservatorship should consider the best
interests of the corporation, various classes of shareholders (common and
preferred), other investors of capital (debt holders), and other stakeholders.
I.

THE HETEROGENEITY OF SHAREHOLDER TIME HORIZONS

The average investor holding period for a share of stock is 200 days,9
but the average does not provide much help in addressing the question of
8. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 352 (quotation omitted).
9. Quick and Dirty, ECONOMIST (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/business/
21708287-are-companies-too-short-termist-quick-and-dirty [https://perma.cc/TCF6-84NK].

616

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 41:613

aligning director duties to shareholder time horizons. The reason is that
shareholder time horizons vary enormously. On the short-time side are
traders who hold shares from microseconds to up to a week. That is not
much of a time horizon, but, nevertheless, such rapid traders are
stockholders. High frequency trading (HFT) strategies hold shares for
microseconds to milliseconds or, at most, for a few hours and account for
55% of the trading volume in the U.S. markets;10 the average holding
period is eleven seconds.11 It seems entirely logical to conclude that these
traders have no interest in the underlying assets of the corporation itself.
Their interest lies more in the technical issues, such as the “spread” in price
between bid and ask for the shares, and the opportunity to trade so as to
capture some of that spread, otherwise called “skimming.”12 As Miller and
Shorter explain,
In general, traders that employ HFT strategies are
attempting to earn small amount of profit per trade. Some
arbitrage strategies reportedly can earn profits close to
100% of the time. Earlier reports indicated that such
strategies might make money on only 51% of the trades,
but because the trades are transacted hundreds or
thousands of times per day, the strategies may still be
profitable.13
Michael Lewis in his book Flash Boys lists several categories of
“predatory behavior” done with HFT (electronic front running, rebate
arbitrate, and slow-market arbitrage).14 A holding period of milliseconds
or microseconds—with or without predatory behavior— has no regard for
how the company is managed and cannot possibly align with
management’s investment period.

10. RENA S. MILLER & GARY SHORTER, CON. RESEARCH SERV., HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING:
OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44443.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KVM7-G7PZ].
11. Barry Ritholtz, Speed Trading in a Rigged Market, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2014),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-03-31/speed-trading-in-a-rigged-market
[http://
perma.cc/6KQT-5EYG].
12. Id.
13. MILLER & SHORTER, supra note 10, at 2.
14. MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 172 (2014).
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Day traders hold stocks for seconds to minutes.15 Some day traders
are “long-term,” holding shares for one to five days.16 Various factors are
used in deciding whether to buy or sell, based on things such as moving
averages, trading volume, and momentum,17 none of which seem to have
anything to do with how the company itself is being managed and cannot
possibly align with the management’s investment period. “You’ll take no
interest in a company’s products or in the underlying long-term
fundamentals of growing corn. You’re simply dealing in a security, buying
it low and selling it high[,]” wrote one author on how to day trade.18
Individual investors currently own about 30% of the shares in
publicly-traded corporations; the balance is held by institutions, most of
whom hold for the benefit of individuals (such as a mutual fund).19
Institutional investors are defined as companies managing assets over
$100 million.20 Mutual funds (domestic equities) hold $6,414.9 billion in
stock, according to the Federal Reserve.21 Private pension funds (equities)
hold $2,372.3 billion in stock.22 All U.S.-registered investment companies
owned 31% of the U.S. corporate equities in 2016,23 of which mutual funds
hold $1,776 billion in defined contribution equity assets plus some
unstated equity percentage in hybrid funds whose value is $988 billion.24
An additional $1.547 trillion is in IRA equity accounts plus some unstated
percentage in hybrid accounts whose value is $831 billion.25 Equity
holdings in variable annuity mutual funds (which presumably are intended

15. Day Trading: Your Dollars at Risk, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 20, 2005),
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsdaytipshtm.html
[https://perma.cc/UFW3-PS6E].
16. MICHAEL SINCERE & DERON WAGNER, THE LONG-TERM DAY TRADER: SHORT-TERM
STRATEGIES TO BOOST YOUR LONG-TERM PROFITS 10 (2000) (ebook).
17. See, e.g., OLIVER VELEZ & GREG CAPRA, TOOLS AND TACTICS FOR THE MASTER DAY
TRADER 11 (2000).
18. JACOB BERNSTEIN, THE ULTIMATE DAY TRADER: HOW TO ACHIEVE CONSISTENT DAY
TRADING PROFITS IN STOCKS, FOREX AND COMMODITIES 21–22 (2009).
19. Bower & Paine, supra note 2; Gretchen Morgenson, Small Investors Support Boards, But
Few Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/business/smallinvestors.html.
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (2011).
21. Financial Accounts Guide, L.122 Mutual Funds, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES.
SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/DisplayTable.aspx?t=l.122 [https://perma.cc/39YWUVBF].
22. Financial Accounts Guide, L.118 Private Pension Funds, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/DisplayTable.aspx?t=l.118 [https://perma.
cc/B5PS-MEC5].
23. INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 13 (2017), https://www.ici.org/
pdf/2017_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RXJ-QU62].
24. Id. at 232.
25. Id. at 233.
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also as retirement vehicles) total approximately $1,673 billion plus an
unstated percentage in hybrid accounts.26
For individual investors, two factors seem most relevant to ascertain
holding periods. One is how often individuals sell their mutual fund
positions, which can reflect either their intended holding period or their
tolerance of underperformance by the fund. If mutual fund investors’
selling of shares is large or rapid enough, the selling could drive the
portfolio manager to sell the stock holdings of the fund. This cash flow out
of mutual needs to be examined in the context of the offsetting buying of
shares of the fund by other individuals. More broadly, the buying and
selling of mutual fund shares can occur in the context of fund investment
approach, which has recently been the case with many investors selling
actively managed funds and buying lower-cost index funds. Recent studies
show that investors have sold $355 billion in active mutual funds and
bought $337 billion in passive (index) mutual funds in 2016.27
A second factor to consider in determining investor holding periods
is the mutual fund portfolio turnover ratio, which reflects both the fund
manager’s holding period and indirectly the tolerance of the fund’s
shareholders for underperformance. Turnover ratios for actively-managed
funds range from under 10% to over 200% with growth mutual funds
tending towards the higher turnover ratios and large-capitalization value
funds tending towards the lower turnover ratios.28 Turnover ratios for
passive (index) funds follow the change in holdings set by the index
maker, which, if the index tracks some slice of the market (e.g. small-cap
value, mid-cap growth, etc.), adjusts based on representative stocks for
that index, changes market capitalization of the individual stocks within
that index and affects sales or mergers of individual stocks or those taken
private (and thus off the exchange) or suspended or withdrawn due to
bankruptcy.29 Thus, a total stock market index has very low turnover ratio
and consequently little change in holdings,30 while a sector index (whether
26. INV. CO. INST., supra note 23, at 227.
27. Charles Stein, When Bad Things Happen to Good Funds, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan.
12, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-12/when-bad-things-happen-to-goodfunds. Flows out and flows in do not necessarily prove money moved from active to passive funds.
Possibly some of the active money was drawn out by older retirees to spend, while newer savers put
new money into passive funds.
28. Turnover Ratio, MORNINGSTAR, http://www.morningstar.com/InvGlossary/turnoverratio.
aspx; William F. Sharpe, Morningstar’s Performance Measures, Fund Characteristics, https://web.
stanford.edu/~wfsharpe/art/stars/stars4.htm [https://perma.cc/4LGE-KLGE].
29. See, e.g., JOHN BOGLE, BOGLE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 180–85 (1994); Albert S. Neubert,
Benchmarks: Definitions and Methodologies, in INDEXING FOR MAXIMUM INVESTMENT RESULTS 19–
35 (Albert S. Neubert ed., 1998).
30. A low-turnover fund has tax advantages when held in a taxable account, but it does have the
risk that the undistributed large capital gains might hit a recent investor in the fund if those gains are
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split as value or growth, or mid-cap versus small-cap) will vary as those
individual stocks grow or slide from value to growth or back to value and
from small-cap to mid-cap to large cap or back down.
Mutual funds may also be segmented into investment objectives so
that target date funds do have a targeted holding period as stated in the
prospectus (and obviously the target date itself), though some funds view
that date as a redemption date and others as a glide path to a conservative
investment strategy that will last another thirty years in retirement.31
“Retirement accounts and plans held about 37% of U.S. stocks in 2015,
worth roughly $8.4 trillion.”32 The table below shows target date funds
from some of the major mutual fund companies; the left column indicates
what those investment horizons are based on those dates.33
Target Date Funds
Retirement Dates
Investment

Investment

Horizon to

Horizon Plus 25 ROCK

Retirement

years in

BLACK-

FIDELITY

T. ROWE

TIAA-

VAN-

PRICE

CREF

GUARD

Retirement
3 years

28

2020

2020

2020

2020

2020

8

33

2025

2025

2025

2025

2025

actually distributed. To the converse, the benefit of the capital gains tax rate against ordinary shortterm gains tax rate is lost if the fund is held in a tax-favored retirement account, although there are still
good investment reasons to hold index funds in retirement accounts. See BOGLE, supra note 29, at
217–18; CHARLES R. SCHWAB, CHARLES SCHWAB’S GUIDE TO FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE 142–45
(1998); Lawrence R. Hudack & Duane M. Ponko, Focus on Aftertax Returns from Nonretirement
Investments in Mutual Equity Funds, 68 CPA J. 76 (Nov. 1998).
31. See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., supra note 23; Wojciech Krawiec, Target Date Funds 2055 - Same
Target Year, Different Glide Paths, 35 RES. PAPERS WROCLAW U. ECON. 77, 79 (2014).
32. Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. Corporate
Stock, TAX NOTES, May 16, 2016, at 923, 928.
33. LifePath Target Date Funds, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/investing/financialprofessionals/defined-contribution/lifepath-target-date-funds [https://perma.cc/EG8S-LZWN]; How
Fidelity Manages Freedom Funds, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/fidelity-fundportfolios/freedom-funds-manage
[https://perma.cc/9C5H-4D73];
Target
Date
Funds,
T.ROWEPRICE, https://www3.troweprice.com/usis/personal-investing/mutual-funds/target-datefunds.html [https://perma.cc/C93F-W9M7]; Performance: Mutual Funds and In-Plan Annuities,
TEACHERS INS. & ANNUITY ASS’N AMERICA, https://www.tiaa.org/public/investmentperformance?defaultview=mfinstonly [https://perma.cc/G4PX-2TR8]; Vanguard Target Retirement
Funds, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/target-retirement/#/ [https://perma.
cc/H738-J3X9].
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13

38

2030

2030

2030

2030

2030

18

43

2035

2035

2035

2035

2035

23

48

2040

2040

2040

2040

2040

28

53

2045

2045

2045

2045

2045

33

58

2050

2050

2050

2050

2050

38

63

2055

2055

2055

2055

2055

43

68

2060

2060

2060

2060

2060

Individuals may have entirely different reasons for investment
holding periods than firms or mutual funds. In financial planning,
investors may invest for particular purposes, such as saving for a down
payment for a house, for college tuition for children, for retirement, for
asset allocation and rebalancing, and for other major purchases. Thus, the
same investor may have multiple horizons ranging from five to thirty-five
years. The many households that invest have an even wider variety of
goals, time horizons, and risk tolerances. The Investment Company
Institute’s 2017 Fact Book notes:
[H]ouseholds often use mutual funds to save for the long
term, such as for college or retirement. . . . many longterm fund shareholders seek the advice of financial
advisers, who may provide a steadying influence during
market downturns. These factors are amplified by the fact
that assets in mutual funds are spread across 94 million
investors and fund investors have a wide variety of
individual characteristics (such as age or appetite for risk)
and goals (such as saving for purchase of a home, for
education, or for retirement).34
Pension funds (and annuity providers) have both immediate payment
demands for current retirees and long-term investment obligations for all
current employees whose retirement date will range from one year to
thirty-five years or longer. Similar time horizons might be expected in
non-traditional corporate forms, such as employee-owned companies
where stockowners are the current employees and probably some retirees.
Some companies are mutual, meaning the customers and policyholders are
also the shareholders. This is common with insurance companies (e.g.,
Northwestern Mutual, State Farm, New York Life, USAA, Massachusetts

34. INV. CO. INST., supra note 23, at 33.
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Mutual) and other companies like REI and Vanguard.35 The time horizon
(if there is one) for employee-owned companies and mutual companies
would seem to be as long as the customer or policyholder is a member and
the employee is an owner; but (like target-date funds), this is an endless
rolling period as new customers/policyholders/employees enlist, so the
company’s real time horizon is, as New York Life’s webpage says, “for
generations to come.”36 It further states:
Mutuality means we are collectively and entirely owned by
our clients, not outside investors. And since we don’t have to
continually appease the bulls and bears of Wall Street, our
exclusive focus—every decision we make—is in the best
interests of our policy owners.
Being able to look beyond short-term profits to invest for
the longterm produces results that speak for themselves.
We’ve amassed a cash reserve in excess of $22 billion. And
we have unfailingly met our financial obligations for over
170 years.
And, we expect, for generations to come.
The fact is, mutuality is at the core of everything we do.
It’s what enables us to stand by our principles of humanity
and integrity every single day. To strive for greatness, but
never at the expense of goodness. To keep our promises, and
do what’s right.
Mutuality also enables our clients to be active participants
in the life of our company. Those who purchase participating
policies have the power to elect members of our board of
directors. And, of course, those policy owners have also
enjoyed the benefit of annual dividends, which in 2016
totaled $1.7 billion.37
Institutional investors have other considerations. Institutional
investors, because of the size of their holdings, may find liquidity is less

35. See, e.g., GEORGE E. REJDA & MICHAEL J. MCNAMARA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT
INSURANCE 88–90 (12th ed. 2014); Why Ownership Matters, VANGUARD,
https://about.vanguard.com/what-sets-vanguard-apart/why-ownership-matters/
[https://perma.cc/
J8VN-9MQ8]; About REI, REI, https://www.rei.com/about-rei.html [https://perma.cc/Y2BA-DRQE]
(REI is a co-op).
36. Mutuality Matters, N.Y. LIFE, https://www.newyorklife.com/about/our-strength/mutualitymatters/ [https://perma.cc/3JZP-G2BQ].
37. Id. (footnotes omitted).
AND
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of an option due in part to moving the market price merely by exiting a
position.38
University endowments will usually have very long time horizons
plus a need for distributions for current operations.39 Total endowments
were $515 billion in 2016, which included all assets, not just equities.40
David Swensen, the portfolio manager of the Yale endowment, puts the
horizon at “centuries,”41 stating “most educational institutions aspire to
exist in perpetuity. . . . The perpetual nature of colleges and universities
makes endowment management one of the investment world’s most
fascinating endeavors.”42
Sovereign wealth funds have similar long-term horizons, described
as “inter-generational” horizons, holding more than $6 trillion in assets;43
Norway’s fund says “the fund’s investments are about the future and
belong to our future generations.”44
While investors have many different holding periods, one study
found that an investment holding period for stocks is fifteen years to
reliably beat the risk-free rate of return 95% of the time and even longer
when investing in large capitalization stock;45 another study put that
holding period at nineteen years.46 If investors collectively were to have
an investment time horizon, these studies would direct that the period be
nearly two decades. For retirement portfolios that may begin at a new
worker’s age of twenty-five, individual investors and their investment
38. John Coffee has explored the agency problems inherent in these institutional investor
arrangements. John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1317–18, 1328–29 (1991).
39. SWENSEN, PIONEERING PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 8–10, 14–15.
40. 2016 NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments, NAT’L ASS’N COLL. & UNIV. BUS.
OFFICERS, http://www.nacubo.org/Research/NACUBO-Commonfund_Study_of_Endowments.html
[https://perma.cc/4WFD-SBLL].
41. SWENSEN, PIONEERING PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 2.
42. Id. at 25.
43. See TAMARA GOMES, THE IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS ON INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL STABILITY 8 (Dec. 2008), http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/
01/dp08-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/L29D-LC65]; Nuno Fernandes, The Impact of Sovereign Wealth
Funds on Corporate Value and Performance, 26 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 76, 83 (2014). The divergence
of sovereign wealth fund time horizons to that of other investors is also noted in Grant M. Hayden &
Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote And The False Promise Of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 489–91 (2008).
44. Responsibility, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT, https://www.nbim.no/en/responsibility/
[https://perma.cc/B4E7-FKKH]. Sovereign wealth funds may create other divergent interests with the
corporate entity, which is a point not relevant here. See, e.g., Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders,
87 N.C.L. REV. 83, 93–95 (2008).
45. Bin Li et al., Stock Returns and Holding Periods, 2 JASSA- FINSIA J. APPLIED FIN. 43, 44
(2012).
46. Shen Pu, How Long Is a Long-Term Investment?, 90 ECON. REV. 1, 12 (2005).
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managers actually will have such a period, particularly if using index
funds, but otherwise it is doubtful that anyone would actually wait fifteen
to nineteen years to see how a particular stock investment turns out.
Even if we could ascertain an investor’s time horizon, there are too
many investors to say what all investors’ time horizons are. “In practice,
of course, shareholders are often not a homogeneous block with a
collective interest. . . . ”47 As one author noted:
A single shareholder, or multiple shareholders with
homogeneous preferences, would in theory be able to
specify a single objective for running the firm.
Shareholders with private interests, however, might prefer
the firm to pursue those interests at the expense of the
interests they have in common with other
shareholders. . . .
Thus, when shareholders have divergent private
interests, it is no longer accurate to think of shareholder
action as a collective good. That conception depends on
there being a uniform maximand for all shareholders.48
Thus, shareholders have short-term and long-term interests,
hedged and unhedged positions, diversified and undiversified interests,
inside versus outside shareholders, social and economic interests (if public
pensions) and labor interests (if labor union pension funds). These
concerns are not limited only to these investors49 and liquidity versus
capital appreciation preferences. Variations on the basic stock security
have their own target horizons, as with options, warrants, conversions (e.g.
convertible bonds), stock redemption and repurchase dates, and covered
puts and calls. Another set of targets lie within executive incentive
compensation plans with their different stock options that have largely and
miserably failed to fix the agency problem by turning managers into active
shareholders-in-control but, instead, created another opportunistic means
for managerial enrichment and extraction of surplus.50 There are even
47. The Business of Business, ECONOMIST (Mar. 21, 2015), https://www.economist.com/
news/business/21646742-old-debate-about-what-companies-are-has-been-revived-business-business;
see also Hayden & Bodie, supra note 43.
48. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV.
561, 575 (2006).
49. Id. at 579–91.
50. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, The Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 561, 566; Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder
Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE. U. L. REV.
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“phantom” shareholders who are credited with stock under incentive
compensation plans but do not actually own shares.51 Diversified
stockholders have multiple investments and may prefer single-minded
emphasis on shareholder wealth maximization (whatever that really is),
while non-diversified investors are (or are like) the founding entrepreneurs
whose interests may be closer to bondholders and employees.52
[A] diversified investor will prefer that management of
any individual company pursue the highest risk-adjusted
return even at the risk of the ruin of the company. In
contrast, an undiversified investor—one with all of his or
her eggs in one basket — will care very much whether
that one company survives. In short, an undiversified
stockholder is risk-averse.53
Stephen Bainbridge expands on this divergence in interest:
Shareholder investment time horizons are likely to vary
from short-term speculation to long-term buy-and-hold
strategies, for example, which in turn is likely to result in
disagreements about corporate strategy. Even more
prosaically, shareholders in different tax brackets are
likely to disagree about such matters as dividend policy,
as are shareholders who disagree about the merits of
allowing management to invest the firm’s free cash flow
in new projects.54
Perhaps only private equity investors give a clear holding period
demand in their stated three- to five-year investment horizons (5.5 is the
average length),55 but this type of rigid investment philosophy effectively
caters to a particular type of investor. It begs the question of how to address
1169, 1176 (2016); Ric Marshall, Out of Whack: U.S. CEO Pay and Long-term Investment Returns,
MSCI RES. INSIGHT, https://www.msci.com/ceo-pay [https://perma.cc/MBS6-N3DA].
51. D. Kyle Sampson, Comment, The Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors to “Phantom”
Stockholders, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1277–78 (1995).
52. Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (Or How Investor
Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BUS. LAW. 429, 435–36 (1998).
53. Id. at 442 (footnote omitted).
54. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV.
601, 623 (2006).
55. Amy Or, Average Private Equity Holding Times Drops to 5.5 Years, WALL ST. J. (June 10,
2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2015/06/10/average-private-equity-hold-times-drop-to-55-years/.
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the duties the board owes the firm when the shareholder base has diverse
horizons, as in the case in publicly-traded corporations.
A further way to classify the different types of investors is by how
they invest. Many investors have little interest in the company qua
company. They care not for the fundamentals. These investors follow the
pattern of stock prices with the view that they can determine trends that
will allow them to profit. The technical stock trader (also called a
“chartist”) looks at moving averages and trading volume and trends of the
market as a whole. Malkiel says, “A true chartist doesn’t even care to know
what business or industry a company is in, as long as he can study its stock
chart.”56 Under Modern Portfolio Theory, the advantage of eliminating
company specific risks results in focus on individual security selection.57
Eugene Fama wrote:
[P]ortfolio theory tells us that the optimal portfolio for any
investor is likely to be diversified across the securities of
many firms. Since he holds the securities of many firms
precisely to avoid having his wealth depend too much on
any one firm, an individual security holder generally has
no special interest in personally overseeing the detailed
activities of any firm.58
With limited interest in particular companies and greater interest in
portfolio asset allocation and diversification, we should expect that this
category of investors, however long-term their horizon, to have little
interest in seeing themselves as owners of the corporation.
Investor focus on company-specific fundamental analysis varies
widely. Some investors focus their analysis within certain sectors of the
market, based on factors such as market capitalization, style, or industry
(sector). Examples would be small cap value, mid-cap growth, utility or
airline or biotechnology companies, etc., with the result that whichever
companies fall into that sectors are the ones the investor examines and

56. BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 118 (1996).
57. BOGLE, supra note 29, at 235–36; MALKIEL, supra note 56, at 203–05; DAVID SWENSEN,
UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS, A FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH TO PERSONAL INVESTMENT 21 (2005)
[hereinafter SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS] (“Security selection plays a minor role in
investment returns, because investors tend to hold broadly diversified portfolios that correlate
reasonably strongly with the overall market.”); SWENSEN, PIONEERING PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT,
supra note 1, at 55–58; Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288, 291 (1980).
58. Fama, supra note 57, at 291.

626

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 41:613

holds.59 Some mutual funds specialize in fulfilling these sectors; the firm
Dimensional Fund Advisors specializes in this portfolio sector slicing and
is a favorite of financial planners.60 Even within sectors, the investor, be it
an individual or a fund, can be largely passive and not follow individual
company issues. For example, exchange-traded funds (ETF) provide a
portfolio of stocks, typically an index, which can be traded as a portfolio61
and can focus on narrow market sectors, even commodities and
currencies.62 ETFs can be traded throughout the day,63 which can create
the need for the ETF to buy and sell the underlying stock holdings.
Given the heterogeneity of investors at any one point in time, we
contend that trying to ascertain an investor’s time horizon for his/her/its
investments is infeasible standing alone, infeasible for reconciling diverse
time horizons and not workable for directors in determining the corporate
investment horizon to correspond with the investors’ time horizons.
Corporate directors, therefore, would be in the irreconcilable position of
appeasing the demands of multiple investors demanding returns across
multiple conflicting periods.
The corporation conceivably can be immortal, so its own investment
decisions can conceivably be similarly long-term,64 although evolving
businesses, markets and technologies will require adjustments, not static
investment decisions. Having a very long corporate investment horizon
would match only a subset of investors, such as university endowments,
foundations, and sovereign wealth funds.
The heterogeneity is also a moving problem with rolling periods
because individual investor time horizons are subject to change. Every
year shareholders make new stock purchases, stock sales, related mutual
fund purchases, and mutual fund redemptions for different reasons. As a
result, the investor who originally had a ten-year horizon now has a nineyear horizon; meanwhile, new investors have a ten-year horizon. Only if
we look at some demographic shift in an aging population that will redeem
59. JOHN A. HASLEM, MUTUAL FUNDS, 206–09 (2003); Bruce D. Westervelt, Adding Value
Through Equity Style Management, in INDEXING FOR MAXIMUM INVESTMENT RESULTS 237–42
(Albert S. Neubert ed., 1998).
60. Robert Barker, So You Think Stock Picking Is a Fool’s Game, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 18,
2002, at 144; Ian Salisbury, The New Faces of Stock Picking, TIME (Jan. 13, 2014), http://time.com/
money/2795053/beat-the-market-without-picking-stocks/ [https://perma.cc/EZ5N-CX36]; Charles
Stein, Charming Investors by Playing Hard to Get, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2015, at 41.
61. GARY L. GASTINEAU, THE EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS MANUAL 110 (2002).
62. DAVID J. ABNER, THE ETF HANDBOOK 162 (2d ed. 2016); FRANCIS GROVES, EXCHANGE
TRADED FUNDS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO EFTS 71–87 (2011).
63. GROVES, supra note 62, at 69; see also GASTINEAU, supra note 61, at 80.
64. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 773–74
(2012); Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation As Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE. U. L. REV. 685, 694–95 (2015).
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more than it invests, might we see some time horizon buoy on the waves
of investment flows.
II.

OTHER DOUBTS ABOUT MATCHING INVESTOR TIME HORIZON’S
TO THE COMPANY’S

For the question posed at this symposium, it might be sufficient to
stop here with the problem of the heterogeneity of investor time horizon
providing no definitive direction to the management of the firm. But there
are other reasons why we ought not to look at investor time horizons to
guide the company’s investment horizon. Those reasons are (1) in the
modern corporation of diversified ownership, common stock investors do
not actually own the company, although they get to vote on directors and
management proposals (and some of the shareholder’s own tendered
proposals); (2) agency theory itself relies on the fiction of shareholder
ownership of the company to support the theory; (3) agency theory, as
supplanted by the more lofty theory of contractualism, dispenses with even
the fictive assumption that shareholders own the corporation. These points
follow.
A. Ownership of Stock Shares Is Not Ownership of The Company
There is no legal basis for the contention that shareholders own the
corporation, which is often made under the agency model of corporate
finance (discussed below). Corporate law states the contrary.
“Shareholders just own shares—that is, bundles of entitlements such as the
right to receive dividends and to vote on certain issues.”65
Corporations come into existence upon the filing and approval of the
articles of incorporation, not when shares are sold.
Under the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and
state corporation statutes with comparable provisions,
unless a delayed effective date is specified, the corporate
existence begins when the articles of incorporation are
filed. In comparison, under the old Model Business
Corporation Act upon the issuance of the certificate of
incorporation, the corporate existence begins.66
Various corporate statutes support this assertion. California law
provides that “corporate existence begins upon the filing of the articles and
65. The Business of Business, supra note 47.
66. MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 166. See generally 1A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 166.

628

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 41:613

continues perpetually, unless otherwise expressly provided by law or in
the articles.”67 Delaware law provides:
Upon the filing with the Secretary of State of the
certificate of incorporation, executed and acknowledged
in accordance with § 103 of this title, the incorporator or
incorporators who signed the certificate, and such
incorporator’s or incorporators’ successors and assigns,
shall, from the date of such filing, be and constitute a body
corporate, by the name set forth in the certificate, subject
to § 103(d) of this title and subject to dissolution or other
termination of its existence as provided in this chapter.68
Georgia law provides:
(a) Unless a delayed effective date is specified, the
corporate existence begins when the articles of
incorporation are filed. (b) The Secretary of State’s filing
of the articles of incorporation is conclusive proof that the
incorporators satisfied all conditions precedent to
incorporation except in a proceeding by the state to cancel
or revoke the incorporation or involuntarily dissolve the
corporation.69
Maryland law provides, “When the Department accepts articles of
incorporation for record, the proposed corporation becomes a body
corporate under the name and subject to the purposes, conditions, and
provisions stated in the articles.”70 Similarly, New York law provides:
Upon the filing of the certificate of incorporation by the
department of state, the corporate existence shall begin,
and such certificate shall be conclusive evidence that all
conditions precedent have been fulfilled and that the
corporation has been formed under this chapter, except in
an action or special proceeding brought by the attorneygeneral.71

67. CAL. CORP. CODE § 200 (West 2014).
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 106 (West 2017).
69. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-203 (West 2017).
70. MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-102 (West 2017).
71. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 403 (McKinney 2017).
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Also, Pennsylvania law states, “Upon the filing of the articles of
incorporation in the Department of State or upon the effective date
specified in the articles of incorporation, whichever is later, the corporate
existence shall begin.”72 Finally, Washington law provides that “[u]nless
a delayed effective date is specified, the corporate existence begins when
the articles of incorporation are filed.”73
Corporations need capital, which is raised by selling shares.74 “It is
not a prerequisite to corporate existence that there be shares of stock issued
or outstanding. The corporation comes into existence when its articles of
incorporation are filed with the Secretary of State,” said the court in
Brodsky v. Seaboard Realty Co.75 “That certificates of stock were not
issued does not detract from this conclusion, for the incorporators became
stockholders and were entitled to have issued to them the certificates for
the number of shares which they had subscribed for,” said the court in J.W.
Williams Co. v. Leong Sue Ah Quin;76 other cases interpreting statutes to
this point are Hammond v. Strauss77 and Hawes v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum
Co.78 In fact, a corporation could buy back all its outstanding shares, as
treasury stock, without delimiting or denigrating the existence of the
corporation, although a few states limit repurchases to surplus capital.79
The assertion that stock shares constitute ownership of the modern
corporation is tenuous because the rights of the shareholders are limited to
the right to vote, the right to inspect the books and records, the right to
hold directors accountable for misconduct,80 the right to preempt (if
granted by statute or by the articles of incorporation),81 and the right to any
residual value after all creditors and preferred stockholders are paid.82 This
puts us back to Berle and Means’ shareholders who have indefinite
72. 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1309 (West 2017).
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.02.030 (West 2017).
74. See generally 1 FLETCHER CORP. FORMS § 6:24 (5th ed.).
75. 206 Cal. App. 2d 504, 515–16 (1962).
76. 44 Cal. App. 296, 298 (1919).
77. See generally 53 Md. 1 (1880).
78. See generally 101 Mass. 385 (1869).
79. 11 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 2847 (discussing the history of treasury shares and the early
prohibitions on buybacks to as “a violation of its charter and a diversion of its funds to an authorized
purpose,” and to avoid “impairment of its capital needed for the protection of creditors.”); see also id.
§§ 2848–49, 5148, 2845; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.31 (2010) (AM. BAR ASS’N).
80. See generally 1 FLETCHER CORP. FORMS § 6:43 (5th ed.); David J. Berger, One Practitioner’s
Random Thoughts on Shareholders’ Rights in the Modern Corporation, in 1 THE ACCOUNTABLE
CORPORATION 121–28 (Marc J. Epstein & Kirk O. Hanson eds., 2006); George D. Hornstein, Rights
of Stockholders in the New York Courts, 56 YALE L.J. 942 (1947).
81. 1 FLETCHER CORP. FORMS § 6:44 (5th ed.).
82. Hornstein, supra note 80, at 955.
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expectations and interests “in the form of distributions and what appraisal
an open market will make of these expectations,”83 where “appraisal”
means tradable nature in liquid stock markets.84
What is the origin of the belief that common shareholders own the
corporation and therefore the corporation should be run in their interest?
The assertion of ownership by the shareholders and their right to financial
information was noted before the “[c]rash” by William Ripley in an
important article preceding Berle and Means’ work.85 Another pre-Berle
book, Business Ownership Organization, describes stockholders as the
owners of capital: “stocks . . . represent an ownership interest or
contributions of capital to remain permanently in the business,” as against
bondholders who expect to receive their loans plus interest,86 (although the
author is not consistent, later describing the ownership of shares as
representing an ownership interest87 and then later as an equitable
interest88). As Ripley and Benjamin Graham noted in their practice of
“shareholder activism,” management disregarded the stockholders’
assertion of interest in the company, often brushing off investor inquiries
with the admonition to sell the stock if they did not like how the company
was run.89
“By tradition, a corporation ‘belongs’ to its shareholders,” wrote
Berle and Means, but this meant the directors would then act as “trustees
83. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 277, 286–287. The appraisal idea was later developed as
a theory of locked-in capital, whereby shareholders could not redeem their shares back to the
corporation absent some repurchase agreement, but, instead, sold to other investors, making those
shares “liquid” in an open market. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 253 (2005) (exploring implications of equity capital lock-in); see also Margaret M. Blair,
Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century,
51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003).
84. AGLIETTA & REBÉRIOUX, supra note 5, at 35 (contending that this liquidity “provides
[shareholders] with a capacity for exit and diversification without equal, in any case much higher than
that of the employees”).
85. William Z. Ripley, Stop, Look, Listen! The Shareholder’s Right to Adequate information,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 1926), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1926/09/stop-look-listen-theshareholders-right-to-adequate-information/376225/ [https://perma.cc/BRM3-E7WJ].
86. ARCHIBALD H. STOCKDER, BUSINESS OWNERSHIP ORGANIZATION 14 (1922).
87. Id. at 86.
88. Id. at 451.
89. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE MEMOIRS OF THE DEAN OF WALL STREET 203 (1996); see
also id. at 199–216. Graham was one of the first to seek out undervalued companies and try to improve
them through shareholder activism, as related in his account of trying to get the management the
Northern Pipeline Company to issue a larger dividend starting in 1925. Armour and Cheffins more
recently studied the period and concluded that “offensive shareholder activism” was rare during this
period, in part due to the same reasons that Graham and Ripley found but led Graham to his success—
the lack of available information. John H. Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, Origins of “Offensive”
Shareholder Activism in the United States, in ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ADVOCACY 253–76
(Johnathan GS Koppel ed., 2001).
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for the sole benefit of inactive and irresponsible security owners.”90
William Allen explains the “tradition” was based on 19th century
corporate law and practice, where “corporate shareholders during this
period did not enjoy the protection of limited liability to the same degree
as they modernly do,” with the corporation existing as “essentially the
stockholders in a special form” for whom the “directors were seen as
agents of the stockholders.”91 Wells explains this period:
Only unanimous shareholder consent could change a
corporation’s purpose, which points to a second
distinctive feature of nineteenth century corporation law:
not only did it constrain the corporation’s activities, but it
also gave meaningful control to shareholders. The
Board’s power over the corporation was, in theory,
limited to managing its day-to-day affairs.92
Other research shows there has long been a question about what
ownership of shares meant as to ownership of the corporation. Epstein
explains that the notion of shareholders owning parts of the corporation
and having the right to vote arose from the New York Stock Exchange’s
requirements and promotions (starting in the 1940s) that attempted to
equate stock ownership with “the political metaphor of corporate
democracy.”93 Initially, the goals were to restore public confidence in the
stock market and thus, draw out the public’s savings in government bonds,
and then later, (as the then president of the American Stock Exchange
testified to Congress) to forestall government regulation by showing that
investors were overseeing the corporations.94 Colleen Dunlavy similarly,
and with greater detail, develops the history of shareholder voting rights,
noting that in the 19th century the concern was horizontal imbalance
among shareholders to plutocratic control, which was addressed by
statutes mandating one-share one-vote, to the post-war 20th century
statutory changes to deal with the vertical imbalance between shareholders

90. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 354.
91. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 261, 266 (1992).
92. Harwell Wells, The Modernization of Corporation Law, 1920-1940, 11 U. PENN. J. BUS. L.
573, 582 (2009).
93. EDWARD J. EPSTEIN, WHO OWNS THE CORPORATION?: MANAGEMENT VS. SHAREHOLDERS
7–8 (1986).
94. Id. at 8–10.
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and management.95 Harwell Wells points out that prior to the post-war
period, the vast majority of securities were bonds and preferred shares
because people viewed common stock as speculative.96 Hayden and Bodie
assert a similar view:
Shareholder primacy could simply be viewed as a
democratic legitimacy argument: the corporation has to
keep shareholder interests at the forefront because
shareholders are the voting polity. But this puts the cart
before the horse: after all, who made the shareholders the
voting polity? The choice of this group as the
enfranchised citizenry is what needs justifying. A variant
of this justification is that shareholders are the
corporation's “owners” and thus are entitled to the
ownership rights of profits and control. However, the
ownership justification is also doomed by its circularity:
who made the shareholders the “owners”? As corporate
law commentators have convincingly pointed out,
shareholders simply purchase a set of rights from the
corporation. The right to vote is made part of the stock
ownership “bundle,” but a stock could be constructed
(and has at times been constructed) without the right to
elect directors. Even shareholders with the right to vote
do not possess many of the rights that traditionally accrue
to property owners--the right to exclude, for example, or
the right of possession. Labeling shareholders “owners”
is no more of a justification for the vote than is labeling
them “voters.”97
Epstein calls shareholders “nominal owners,”98 which is probably
more accurate than cases that refer to shareholders as equitable or
“beneficial owners,”99 these latter terms being considerably ambiguous
unless used to identify beneficial owners of shares held in street name or
95. Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History of
Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1359–65 (2006).
96. Wells, supra note 92, at 586–87.
97. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 43, at 473; cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 688–94 (2007) (arguing that the shareholder vote accomplishes little
due to structural impediments in governance and voting).
98. EPSTEIN, supra note 93, at 13.
99. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F2d. 659, 681 (3rd Cir. 1970), vacated on
other grounds 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
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trust,100 in a close corporation,101 preferred shareholders,102 owners trying
to sue to recover debts of the inactive or dissolved corporation,103 or
derivative suits,104 as the cases in the footnote illustrate. And when looking
at individual retirement investors through their employer-provided 401(k)
and 403(b), accounts, “nominal owners” and “beneficial owners” look like
accurate terms to describe the employee putting money into the employerprovided plans, which are overseen by the employers as fiduciaries (with
many under ERISA), with separate third-party record keepers and
administrators, multiple fund companies, mutual fund managers and submanagers, trustees for the retirees, stock custodians and transfer agents.
Thus, the terms “nominal” or “beneficial owner,” as terms, make more
sense for the employee-investor through multiple layers of administrators
and intermediaries.
Julian Velasco contends the “tradition” of ownership should be
right—that shareholders own the corporation—but admits there is no law
that actually supports this tradition.105
100. See, e.g., Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1991); Phillips v. United Corp.,
No. 40-497, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1947); Bird v. Wilmington Soc. of Fine
Arts, 43 A.2d 476 (Del. 1945); In re Digex S’holders Litig., No. 18336-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40
(Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2002); Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W.3d 615, 620–21 (Tex. 2012).
101. See generally Continental Bank v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 392, 392 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972); Kauffman-Harmon v. Kauffman, 36 P.3d 408, 409–410 (Mont. 2001); Snyder v. Freeman, 266
S.E.2d 593, 597–99 (N.C. 1980) (finding an express shareholder agreement for issuance of shares in
place of the money owed as a creditor); Commonwealth v. Woodlands Cemetery Co., 13 Pa. D. &
C.2d 548, 549-550 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.1957) (finding that a corporation established to operate a cemetery
and certificate holders were granted rights to the land); Sneed v. Webre, 465 S.W.3d 169, 174 (Tex.
2015) (“Ownership of the entities comprising the family business has remained within the Webre
family.”); McAlister v. Eclipse Oil Co., 98 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1936) (when there are three
stockholders, “strictly speaking, the ownership of the stock does not carry with it the equitable title to
the corporate property. This simply means, however, that the stockholders have no right to require the
corporation to convey to them the legal title to the corporate property. In a larger or real sense the
stockholders of a corporation are the beneficial owners of its corporate properties”).
102. Cotton v. Weatherford Bancshares, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 687, 697 (Tex. App. 2006) (referring
to the preferred shareholder as “equitable or beneficial owner” with a right to inspect), overruled on
other grounds Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014).
103. See generally Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Blankenburg, 235 S.W.2d 891, 893–94 (Tex.
1951); Aransas Pass Harbor Co. v. Manning, 94 Tex. 558, 563, (Tex. 1901) (“A stockholder, merely
as such, has no direct agency in the control of the business of the corporation. He has no direct interest
in the property. His right to such property is collateral. But in its last analysis, the stockholders are the
beneficial owners of the assets of the corporation. This proceeding is instituted upon the theory, which
we think a correct one, that the shareholders are the ultimate owners of the corporate property, and,
when the corporation is dissolved and its creditors are satisfied, they hold title to the assets in
proportion to their respective shares.”); Timbertech, Inc. v. Wallboards, Inc., No. 14-98-00422-CV,
1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 6397, *2 (Tex. App. 1999); ; Zimmerman v. Kyte, 765 P.2d 905, 12 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1988).
104. E.g., Sneed, 465 S.W.3d at 173–174, (Tex. 2015).
105. Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 930 (2010).
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Admittedly, it is difficult to find very much case law
directly addressing the issue of ownership. However,
there is a great deal of case law that implicitly reaffirms
the traditional view. For example, as discussed earlier,
Delaware courts generally insist that the directors of a
corporation owe their fiduciary duties ‘to the corporation
and its shareholders.’ Unfortunately, [unlike Delaware,]
most of the courts’ statements on fiduciary duties are
ambiguous. While they do support the traditional view,
they also can be interpreted consistently with other
theories.106
On the contrary, there is law against the traditional assertion, such as a
1932 Texas case, McClory v. Schneider, which cites to even earlier cases.
A transfer of stock of a corporation or a transfer of
certificates of stock which only evidence the stock, is held
not to be a transfer of the property and assets of the
corporation itself. The owner of a share of stock in a
corporation owns no part of the capital, and is not the
owner nor entitled to the possession of any definite
portion of its property or assets. Hence the purchaser of
stock in a corporation does not purchase any portion of
the corporation’s assets, nor is a sale of all the stock of a
corporation a sale of the physical properties of the
corporation.107
Additionally, John Armour shifts the meaning of ownership from
ownership of the corporation to ownership of the residual rights.108
About 100 years of arguments have yet to settle the question about
whether shareholders (particularly those in large, publicly-listed
corporations) are owners. Arguments and metaphors are the only
underpinnings that exist. So, roughly $22 trillion in the U.S. stock markets
exists without any certainty that the investors own anything more than a
stock certificate in paper or electronic form, plus the residual after
everyone else who does have an identifiable claim on the assets clears
those out.
106. Id.
107. McClory v. Schneider, 51 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. App. 1932).
108. John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law, 27
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 429, 437 (2007).
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Berle and Means rejected both this theory (or tradition) of
shareholders owning the corporation, and its opposite theory, that the
controlling powers could operate the corporation in their own selfinterest,109 which became known as the “managerialist” theory110. Berle
and Means instead chose a third course, stating:
[T]he owners of passive property, by surrendering control
and responsibility over the active property, have
surrendered the right that the corporation should be
operated in their sole interest,—they have released the
community from the obligation to protect them to the full
extent implied in the doctrine of strict property rights,
[thus leading] the community . . . to demand that the
modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the
control but all society, [thereby] balancing a variety of
claims by various groups in the community.111
The point was not to “line shareholders’ pockets regardless of the
consequences,” but “to bring managerial discretion under legal control.”112
This was in the context of shareholders being middle-class and workingclass people who were now holding stocks113 (not through mutual
funds114), and not the corporate raiders of the 1970s. This was to further
“disperse ownership and economic power widely . . . against the action of
powerful elite interest what would want to counteract the threats of the
egalitarian operation of the corporation.”115
B.

The Myth of Agency Theory

It is worth looking at the fictions and assumptions in the agency
theory literature that created this myth of shareholder value, which has led
to the idea that the shareholder’s investment time horizon is the guide for
109. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 354.
110. Bratton, supra note 5, at 1476.
111. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 355–56 (the “community” Berle and Means refer to is
synonymous with “stakeholders”).
112. Fenner Stewart, Jr., Berle’s Conception of Shareholder Primacy: A Forgotten Perspective
for Reconsideration During the Rise of Finance, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1457, 1464, 1478 (2011); see
also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf
Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 107–11 (2008).
113. Stewart, supra note 112, at 1458, 1462–63.
114. A few mutual funds existed in the late 1920s, but the impetus for the growth and regulation
of mutual funds was the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of
1940. See James E. McWhinney, A Brief History of the Mutual Fund, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/05/mfhistory.asp [https://perma.cc/CB8P-KRGW].
115. Stewart, supra note 112, at 1463.
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the corporation’s investment horizon. The myth of shareholder value was
exposed by Lynn Stout,116 among others, because of its consequential
derailing of corporate governance from the law’s view of corporate
governance and relations between shareholders and the directors and the
corporation.
Despite Berle’s essential rejection of the idea of shareholders owning
the corporation, Berle’s conception of the directors as trustees for the
shareholders in aggregate in part, led all stakeholders to shift in the 1970s
to the assumption that shareholders do own the corporation and therefore
the corporation should maximize shareholder value.117 The assumption
was in the economic finance literature, first by Milton Friedman,118 then
formally developed as agency theory by Michael Jensen and William
Meckling in their article, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.119 Jensen and Meckling said the
relationship between stockholders and managers looked like an agency
relationship, so it must be an agency relationship, which they created for
their theory.120 But they needed more to make this work, so they created a
“fiction” that the corporation had contracts with the shareholders:
We retain the notion of maximizing behavior on the part
of all individuals in the analysis to follow.
....
Since the relationship between the stockholders and
manager of a corporation fit the definition of a pure
agency relationship it should be no surprise to discover
that the issues associated with the ‘separation of
ownership and control’ in the modern diffuse ownership
corporation are intimately associated with the general
problem of agency.
....
. . . Unfortunately, the analysis of these more
general organizational issues is even more difficult than
116. LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
(2012); Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of
Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE.
U. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2013). See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
117. The shift from Berle’s conception to the agency conception and shareholder value
maximization is chronicled in ROBERT TEITELMAN, BLOODSPORT (2016).
118. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 6.
119. See generally Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
120. Id. at 308.
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
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that of the ‘ownership and control’ issue because the
nature of the contractual obligations and rights of the
parties: are much more varied and generally not as well
specified in explicit contractual arrangements.
....
. . . Contractual relations are the essence of the firm,
not only with employees but with suppliers, customers,
creditors, etc. The problem of agency costs and
monitoring exists for all of these contracts, independent
of whether there is joint production in their sense; i.e.,
joint production can explain only a small fraction of the
behavior of individuals associated with a firm.
It is important to recognize that most organizations
are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set
of contracting relationships among individuals.
....
The private corporation or firm is simply one form
of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting
relationships and which is also characterized by the
existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and
cashflows of the organization which can generally be sold
without permission of the other contracting individuals.121
Note that Jensen and Meckling developed two ideas here: one of
agency problem and another of imaginary contracts.122 Eugene Fama
abandoned the shareholders-as-owners fiction for his expansion of Jensen
and Mecklin’s contractual theory.123
The firm is viewed as a set of contracts among factors of
production, with each factor motivated by its self-interest.
Because of its emphasis on the importance of rights in the
organization established by contracts, this literature is
characterized under the rubric ‘property rights.’ . . .
. . . [T]he firm as a set of contracts among factors of
production. In effect, the firm is viewed as a team whose
members act from self-interest but realize that their
destinies depend to some extent on the survival of the
team in its competition with other teams. This insight,
however, is not carried far enough. In the classical theory,
121. Id. at 307–11, 309 n.10 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 307–11.
123. Fama, supra note 57, at 289–91.
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the agent who personifies the firm is the entrepreneur who
is taken to be both manager and residual risk bearer. . . .
The main thesis of this paper is that separation of
security ownership and control can be explained as an
efficient form of economic organization within the ‘set of
contracts’ perspective. We first set aside the typical
presumption that a corporation has owners in any
meaningful sense. The attractive concept of the
entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes
of the large modern corporation. Instead, the two
functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur,
management and risk bearing, are treated as naturally
separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm.
....
However, ownership of capital should not be
confused with ownership of the firm. Each factor in a firm
is owned by somebody. The firm is just the set of
contracts covering the way inputs are joined to create
outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared
among inputs. In this ‘nexus of contracts’ perspective,
ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept. Dispelling
the tenacious notion that a firm is owned by its security
holders is important because it is a first step toward
understanding that control over a firm’s decisions is not
necessarily the province of security holders.
....
. . . [P]ortfolio theory tells us that the optimal
portfolio for any investor is likely to be diversified across
the securities of many firms. Since he holds the securities
of many firms precisely to avoid having his wealth depend
too much on any one firm, an individual security holder
generally has no special interest in personally overseeing
the detailed activities of any firm. In short, efficient
allocation of risk bearing seems to imply a large degree of
separation of security ownership from control of a firm.124
Outside directors are hired to act as referees to the internal
contracts and collusion of management.125 Milton Friedman
previously justified using completely unrealistic, even erroneous

124. Id. at 289–91 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 294.
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assumptions, if they made the theory work, and this is informative to
cracking the theories of the agency problem and nexus of contracts.
Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found
to have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate
descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the
more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the
assumptions (in this sense). . . .
To put this point less paradoxically, the relevant
question to ask about the ‘assumptions’ of a theory is not
whether they are descriptively ‘realistic,’ for they never
are, but whether they are sufficiently good
approximations for the purpose in hand.
....
. . . [T]he “assumptions of a theory” play three
different, though related, positive roles: (a) they are often
an economical mode of describing or presenting a theory;
(b) they sometimes facilitate an indirect test of the
hypothesis by its implications and (c) as already noted,
they are sometimes a convenient means of specifying the
conditions under which the theory is expected to be valid.
....
To state the point more generally, what are called the
assumptions of a theory can be used to get some indirect
evidence on the acceptability of the hypotheses in so far
as the assumptions can themselves be regarded as
implications of the hypothesis, and hence their conformity
with reality as a failure of some implications to be
contradicted, or in so far as the assumptions may call to
mind other implications of the hypothesis susceptible to
casual empirical observation.
....
. . . Complete “realism” is clearly unattainable, and
the question whether a theory is realistic ‘enough’ can be
settled only by seeing whether it yields predictions that
are good enough for the purpose in hand or that are better
than predictions from alternative theories.126

126. MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 14–15, 23, 28, 41 (1953).
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Thus, according to Friedman, the assumption is valid, however
wrong, if it makes the theory work and the theory itself creates and justifies
the assumption.
Economist Kenneth Arrow noted the failure of the simple principalagent economic theory to fit with or explain the complex reality of
contracts and complex relations, while the complex fee-functions the
theory can generate are not found in actual contracts.127 Another problem
is that imaginary contracts are always welfare-enhancing to both parties
but real agreements are not always so, which is a problem for agency
theory if the goal is contractual welfare that further obliges all the default
rules the economic models of contracts require.128
C. The Contractualism Theory That Underlays Agency Theory Is
Uselessly Flawed Due to the Absence of Contracts
The agency theory and its sibling, the contractual nexus, were key
drivers for the shareholder value maximization ideology that developed in
the 1970s and later129 (although Bratton contends these are also found in
earlier conceptions of the corporation).130 As for the contractual relations
used by the shareholders to direct the board of directors in their
governance,131 this is pure fiction because there are absolutely no contracts
between the common shareholders and the directors. There is not even a
contract in the prospectus or registration statement as to obligations and
rights between the corporation, its directors, and its shareholders.132 Even
if stock purchasers were to look at the prospectus (a doubtful assumption
after the initial public offering crowd), that would only bear upon the
initial purchasers and maybe a couple of buyers beyond that (if one
assumes that any of those subsequent stock purchasers looked at the
prospectus). But beyond that, how many years out can that original
prospectus still be relevant, if even found? (Corporate charters are a
127. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE
37, 46–49 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., 1985).
128. Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on Dean Clark, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1748, 1751–52
(1989).
129. See, e.g., TEITELMAN, supra note 117; Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, supra note 116.
130. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm, Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1472 (1989).
131. See Peer Zumbansen, Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: The Corporation as Governance
Object, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1469, 1484–86 (2012), for an analysis of what Zumbansen calls
“contract governance.”
132. The point is self-evident, but has also been raised in Victor Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1411 (1985).
OF BUSINESS
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different matter, but they are so generic about engaging in any lawful
business as to be nearly useless as a guide for the business plan.) Besides,
the stockholders’ rights are statutory, as determined by both state
corporation law and the Securities and Exchange Acts.133
The lack of a contract (strangely and remarkably) does not
undermine agency theory because the theorists shift the contracts to a new
problem of incomplete contracts, which are filled in with whatever
assumptions fix the theory.134 As Stephen Bainbridge contends, the
contract is “viewed as a metaphor rather than as a positive account of
economic reality” that refers to “long-term relationships characterized by
asymmetric information, bilateral monopoly, and opportunism.”135 This
metaphor gets around the legal baggage of consideration, mutuality, and
transactions, he says.136
Susanna Ripken writes, “These ‘contracts’ are not true contracts as
defined by law, but the economist’s notion of contracts as reciprocal
arrangements involving mutual expectations between parties,”137 or as
133. Wells calls them contractual, but he means this in contradistinction from the earlier
corporate law charters granted by special acts of legislators. Wells, supra note 92, at 602. Wells further
quotes Elwyn G. Davies, Reflections of the Amateur Draftsmen of the Ohio General Corporation Act,
12 WISC. L. REV. 487, 488 n.168 (1937) (noting that the committee of lawyers who drafted the Ohio
Act “accepted and used as a basis the contract theory, though aware that when applied to a corporation
with any considerable number of shareholders this theory has its limitations and there is no contract
in the sense in which the term is commonly understood”).
134. The contractarian theory of corporate law has been addressed in many articles. A good
summary of the history and application is David Million, Frontiers of Legal Thought I: Theories of
the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 229–31 (1990); see also Armour & Whincop, supra note 108;
Susanna E. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate
Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 137, 158–67 (2009). But see William W.
Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407
(1989); Brudney, supra note 132; Ige Omotayo Bolodeoku, Contractarianism and Corporate Law:
Alternative Explanation to The Law’s Mandatory and Enabling/Default Contracts, 13 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 433 (2005); Ireland, infra note 140 (providing a history of contract and property
theories back to joint stock companies, which were essentially partnerships in their management).
Additionally, a fascinating account of the philosophical, legal, and religious origins of contractualism,
written long before the economists employed contract theory in corporate theory, is Morris R. Cohen,
The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933) (“As the result of the various forces that have
thus supported the cult of contractualism there has been developed in all modern European countries
(and in those which derive from them) a tendency to include within the categories of contract
transactions in which there is no negotiation, bargain, or genuinely voluntary agreement.”). A
contemporary assessment of contract theories in the contractarian context is Robert C. Clark,
Contracts, Elites and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703 (1989).
135. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique
of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 871 (1997).
136. Id. Bainbridge contends the board of directors is the nexus of contracts. Id. We agree with
Bainbridge that the firm has a “nexus,” and indeed is the nexus. Id. at 859. Certainly, the firm has
contracts with some of the stakeholders, but we are doubtful of the assertion of a nexus of contracts
outside of those contracts, and we disagree that the nexus of contracts is the directors.
137. Ripken, supra note 134, at 158.

642

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 41:613

rules rather than any real type of contract.138 Robert Clark identifies
additional problems with the economic assumption and theory.
Specifically, he notes that there is no bargaining, there are no implicit
terms, basic fiduciary duties cannot be bargained around, and the role of
directors is defined by fiduciary law as developed by case law and
corporate statutes.
No one has shown, and I believe it is clearly not the case,
that legislative changes to corporate statutes typically
represent efforts merely to codify as general presumptions
certain rights and duties that have already become
prevalent in actual contracts. Nor are court decisions
elaborating the contours of particular fiduciary duties
merely filling in the gaps and ambiguities of actual
contracts between the litigants in question.139
According to Paddy Ireland, what little basis there is for shareholders
and directors having a contract traces back to joint stock companies, which
looked like partnerships, though the rise of the corporation and limited
liability meant the shareholders were no longer anything like partners.
[W]ith the introduction by the Joint Stock Companies Act
1844 of incorporation by registration, the relationship
between the shareholders of most companies and third
parties ceased to be contractual at all: third-party creditors
now dealt not with a collection of partners liable for each
other, but with companies as separate, property-owning,
legal (and corporate) entities.
....
. . . [T]he gradual demise of the partnership-based idea of
directors as the agents of shareholders reflected the
emergence of the company as a property-owning legal
person and the erosion of the contractual character of the
relationships of shareholders with both directors and one
another. Once again, the growing detachment and
138. See Fred S. McChesney, Contractarianism Without Contracts? Yet Another Critique of
Eisenberg, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1334 (1990) (“This point goes back to the seminal contractarian
model that every graduate student in economics studies. There, Coase defined the firm as the set of
agreements by which individuals agree to operate by ongoing rules rather than a series of constantly
renegotiated spot contracts. The advantage of contractual rules is the reduction of transaction costs.”).
Id.
139. Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 63 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
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externality of shareholders from ‘the company’ and the
process of production lay at the root of these changes.
Indeed, for courts and legislature, struggling to protect the
new breed of shareholder and to secure the integrity of the
share as a new intangible form of property, there were
compelling reasons for moving away from a partnershipbased, overtly contractual conception of, and approach to,
joint stock companies and their constituent relations.140
Thus, shareholders do not own corporations, directors are not agents
for the shareholders, and contracts between them do not exist.141 Rather,
as Ripken concluded, the shareholders are only “the economist’s notion of
rational self-interested actors,” the corporation “is the center of a mass of
contracts,” and the result is that “no independent, real corporate entity
exists,” meaning the corporation itself is a fiction, and the “ownership of
the firm also disappears as a meaningful concept.”142 We might say the
agency and contract theories have reached escape velocity of the orbit of
reality.
D. The Unified Theory of Shareholder Interest Belies the
Heterogeneity of Shareholders’ Interests and Competencies
Daniel Greenwood argues further that shareholders, in the corporate
conception, are fictional.
Shareholders are a convenient and sometimes extremely
misleading metaphor that can prevent us from seeing the
real rights and responsibilities at issue. . . . Rather,
shareholders are treated as if their entire identity were
their share ownership, as if their sole goal in life were to
maximize the risk-adjusted present value of the future
income stream represented by those shares and as if they
140. Patty Ireland, Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory, 23 LEGAL STUD.
453, 463, 465 (2003).
With these and other related developments the law relating to joint stock
companies increasingly departed from the ordinary principles of agency and
contract which underlay the law of partnership. Indeed, by the final decades of
the century, the processes of decontractualisation had become so advanced that
company law finally separated out from the law of partnership, crystallizing
into a fully autonomous, independent, and quite distinctive legal category.
Id. at 471.
141. See, e.g., Bower, supra note 2, at 53; Brudney, supra note 132.
142. Ripken, supra note 134, at 158–59.
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had no competing interests that might, even occasionally,
warrant taking an action not designed to improve
‘shareholder’ value.143
Additionally, Greenwood states:
. . . [T]he fictional shareholder is fundamentally different
from the human beings who ultimately stand behind the
fiction. The law and the legally created structure of
corporation and market filter out all the complexity of
conflicted, committed, particularly situated, deeply
embedded and multi-faceted human beings, leaving only
simple, one-sided monomaniacs. Human beings have
short lives, spent in particular places with particular
relationships to other human beings; they constantly
confront the problems of finitude and commitment.
Shareholders, in contrast, are in significant senses
immortal, uncommitted and universal: They are
indifferent as to time and place, language and religion.
They are indifferent between projects and personalities.
They are understood to care deeply about one important
and vital human aim -- profit maximization -- but not at all
about numerous others. While the ultimate owners of the
shares are specific, situated, conflicted and committed
human beings, shareholders in most instances may be
thought of more appropriately as a “large, fluid,
changeable and changing market.”144
The problems and failures of corporate governance that emanated
from the normative directive of abiding by a myth (as Stout called it) based
on theories, in turn based on assumptions generated to justify the theory,
have been chronicled in many articles addressing the limits of agency costs
and principal control.145
[C]entralization
of
essentially
nonreviewable
decisionmaking authority in the board of directors. The
chief economic virtue of the public corporation is not that
it permits the aggregation of large capital pools, as some
143. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1029–30 (1996).
144. Id. at 1025–26.
145. See, e.g., Hill & McDonnell, supra note 50, at 564–70.
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have suggested, but rather that it provides a hierarchical
decisionmaking structure well-suited to the problem of
operating a large business enterprise with numerous
employees, managers, shareholders, creditors, and other
inputs. In such a firm, someone must be in charge . . . .146
Sitkoff expands on this:
Active monitoring is not a satisfactory answer to the
agency problem. Even if the principal has spelled out
what the agent should do in a particular contingency, it is
often infeasible for the principal to monitor the agent’s
compliance with those instructions. Agents are often
retained because the principal lacks the specialized skills
necessary to undertake the activity on his own. In such a
case, the skill deficit that prompted the principal to engage
the agent will limit the principal’s ability to monitor the
agent.”147 Others note there are “principal costs” with
having shareholders responsible for the majority of the
corporation’s decision,148 and it is probably more efficient
to delegate decision-making to “elites” (regulators, judges
and legislators, even influential law professors and the
American Law Institute with their expertise in relevant
fields).149
146. Bainbridge, supra note 54, at 626.
147. Symposium, The Role of Fiduciary Law and Trust in The Twenty-First Century: A
Conference Inspired by The Work of Tamar Frankel: Panel II: An Interdisciplinary View of Fiduciary
Law: The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1039, 1041 (2011).
148. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and
Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770–71 (2017) (“Principal costs occur when investors exercise
control, and agent costs occur when managers exercise control. Both types of cost can be subdivided
into competence costs, which arise from honest mistakes attributable to a lack of expertise,
information, or talent, and conflict costs, which arise from the skewed incentives produced by the
separation of ownership and control. When investors exercise control, they make mistakes due to a
lack of expertise, information, or talent, thereby generating principal competence costs. To avoid such
costs, they delegate control to managers whom they expect will run the firm more competently. But
delegation separates ownership from control, leading to agent conflict costs, and also to principal
conflict costs to the extent that principals retain the power to hold managers accountable. Finally,
managers themselves can make honest mistakes, generating agent competence costs.”). Id.
149. Clark, supra note 134, at 1723 (“[E]lites may have access to more and better information
relevant to rule making. Elite rule makers may sometimes be better processors of whatever information
is available, because of their intrinsic or acquired abilities, or because they are specialists who have
the time to focus more carefully on available information, thus reaping economies of scale in its
use. . . . Despite the agency costs generated by elitism and the unavoidably imperfect alignment of
incentives that bring them about, elite rule making may have net benefits for rule subjects. There is no
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Shareholders are not single-minded about corporate policy, but
disregard of the shareholders led to minority oppression, which led to the
normalization of the idea of shareholder primacy as “a way of forcing
homogeneity onto a very diverse set of shareholder interests.”150 As Blair
and Stout observed:
Because American law does not permit shareholders to
command the board to action, describing directors as
shareholders’ “agents” grossly misrepresents at least the
legal nature of their relationship. In the eyes of the law,
corporate directors are a unique form of fiduciary who, to
the extent they resemble any other form, perhaps most
closely resemble trustees.151
Shareholders are not principals, directors are not the agents for the
shareholders, and directors’ decisions are not necessarily protected by the
business judgment rule if they merely follow the instructions of the
shareholders (the nominal alleged principals).152 Greenwood says:
The general rule is that directors would be in breach of the
law if they accepted such instructions. Like Edmund
Burke’s statesman, but unlike the Populist legislative
model of direction, initiative and referendum, directors
are required to exercise independent judgment, not simply
to follow their constituents’ -- let alone principals’ -orders. Indeed, in the precise opposite of the agency law
rule, directors are not necessarily protected in their
decisions by turning a matter over to shareholders for
decision, and may not defend a shareholder suit on the
ground that they were doing no more than they were
instructed to do or that they pledged to do prior to their
appointment.153

a priori reason to preclude the possibility that the informational advantages of elite rule making may
outweigh the agency costs it creates . . . .”). Id. at 1719–20.
150. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 43, at 480, 502.
151. Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note 116, at 291.
152. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in
Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 726–28, 731 (2006).
153. Greenwood, supra note 143, at 1041. Greenwood later agrees that shareholders are useful
to the agency metaphor and guide the directors to put aside their own interests. See id. at 1044. But
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A case that evinces this lack of shareholder authority to direct the
corporation is Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,154 where the
court affirmed Wal-Mart’s exclusion of a shareholder proposal that sought
to compel Wal-Mart to stop the sale of high-capacity assault rifles. The
court said Wal-Mart was right to exclude the proposal because it pertained
to an ordinary business operations, and thus came within the SEC rule 14a8(i)(7), which “allows a company to exclude proposals that ‘deal . . . with
a matter relating to the company’s business operations.’ 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(i)(7).”155
III.

CONSERVATORSHIPS

Finance literature offers a bridge from the concept of agency theory
to a notion of the assets of the corporation as the key focus for governance.
Oliver Williamson argues that the claims of the various providers of
capital (e.g., debt and equity) are themselves “governance structures.”156
In the Williamsonian view, the nature of the firm’s assets plays a large role
in how those assets should be financed. “Redeployable” assets can be
financed by “rules” (debt financing), while those assets that are “nonredeployable” are better financed by equity since they require more
discretion.157 While agency theory and Williamson’s view have some
similarities because they both focus on discretion of the equity component,
there is a key difference in the fundamental unit of analysis.158 In the
Williamson framework,159 the transaction, as opposed to the agent, is the
fundamental unit of analysis.160
The transaction-based view of the firm allows a broader conception
of governance in an era where shareholder–manager agency leads to the
irreconcilable challenges of stock investor horizon or, even more broadly,
this is the same as the directors’ statutory duties to act in the interests of the corporation and not in
their own self-interest.
154. 792 F.3d 323, 352 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015).
155. Id.; see also Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated
on other grounds, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (where the plaintiff sought to require Dow Chemical to include
a shareholder proposal to stop the manufacture and sale of napalm then used in the Vietnam War. The
court of appeals required the company to include the proposal, calling the shareholders “the true
beneficial owners of the corporation”).
156. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J.
FIN. 567 (1988).
157. Id. at 567, 580 n.24, 581.
158. Id. at 571.
159. Id.
160. See generally Oliver Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
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stock investor objective. The transactions cost view of corporate
governance returns the emphasis to the nature of the firm’s assets.
Shareholders, be they rapid traders or long-term holders, have a residual
claim on firm assets. To the extent that corporate managers deploy capital
other than equity, they share in the governance of the claims on firm assets.
If the nature of the firm’s assets aligns with the use of both debt and equity,
then the overall value of the enterprise may increase, assuming there are
real world frictions such as deductibility of interest.161
Thus, the shift from a shareholder-centric view of the firm to an
asset-based view of the firm allows those who make operating and
financing decisions to view the value of the firm more from a basis of
assets than from a view of equity claims. This argument does not
presuppose that managers (or any individual agent) do not act in their own
interest. Notwithstanding these motives, the goal of acting on behalf of the
corporation aligns better with a focus of what makes the corporation itself
unique—its assets. The nature of the assets drives the major decisions of
corporate finance, including capital structure, capital budgeting, and
working capital management. “The conflict of interest between debt and
equity over investment or distribution policy or capital structure implicates
the economic question of whether the goal of the corporate decision-maker
should be to maximize stockholders’ value rather than enterprise (and
possibly creditors’) value if its decision affects those values differently.”162
The financial model of transactions involving all assets aligns
reasonably well with the conservatorship model of the corporation,
whereby the directors are subject to fiduciary obligations of loyalty and to
avoid self-dealing.163 Here, the directors are to act in the best interest of
the corporation. This fits with the actual statutory duties imposed on
directors: to act in the best interest of the corporation. For example,
California’s Corporations Code provides:
A director shall perform the duties of a director, including
duties as a member of any committee of the board upon
which the director may serve, in good faith, in a manner
such director believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders . . . .164
Under Connecticut law,
161. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and
the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 261–97 (1958).
162. Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 645
(1997).
163. Id. at 601.
164. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2017).
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[a] director shall discharge his duties as a director,
including his duties as a member of a committee: (1) In
good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person
in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation.165
Georgia law provides, “A director shall discharge his duties as a
director, including his duties as a member of a committee: (1) In a manner
he believes in good faith to be in the best interests of the
corporation . . . .”166 A few states insert this in the indemnity authorization
statutes. For example, Delaware law allows indemnity for the director “if
the person acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation . . . .”167 Similarly, New York law allows for indemnification
where a director “acted, in good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably
believed to be in, or, in the case of service for any other corporation or any
partnership, joint venture, trust, employee benefit plan or other enterprise,
not opposed to, the best interests of the corporation . . . .”168
The conservatorship model reconceives the directors as trustees
rather than as mere agents for the amorphous and diverse group of
shareholders, and, as Brudney says about fiduciaries, the exclusive benefit
principle owed by the fiduciaries starts with “thick restrictions that
substantially hamper their freedom to act with respect to, or to alter their
state-imposed obligations to their beneficiaries.”169 “The corporation law
does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their powers to
manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of
shares.”170
While corporate democracy is a pertinent concept, a
corporation is not a New England town meeting;
directors, not shareholders, have responsibilities to
165. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756 (2017).
166. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-830(a)(1) (2017) (prior to May 9, 2017, amendment); see also MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1(c) (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1541a
(West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-8-30 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.357 (West
2017); TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. § 22.221 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (West 2017);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.300 (West 2017).
167. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (West 2017). See generally Frederick Hsu Living Trust v.
ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67, at *60–61 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017);
In Re Trados, Inc. Shareholder Litig. 73 A.3d 17, 38 (Del. Ch. 2013).
168. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 722(a) (McKinney 2017).
169. Brudney, supra note 162, at 598.
170. In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 38 (quoting Paramount Commc’ns. Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 10670,
1989 WL 79880, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989)).
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manage the business and affairs of the corporation,
subject however to a fiduciary obligation.171
Thus, the directors’ duties cannot be reduced to mere contractual relations
to be waived away by the beneficiaries because the power to consent by
the beneficiary (whether by the corporation or the shareholders) is
constrained.172 This also means the directors’ responsibility is higher than
the business judgment rule, which can be used “to justify the board’s
decision as long as judicial review, within the parameters of the business
judgment rule presumption, can devise a minimum proper rationale for the
decision.”173 The distinction is noted in In Re Trados Shareholder
Litigation,174 which also allows three levels of review depending on the
alleged misconduct.
[E]ven though modern corporate law, as currently written,
has shied away from describing corporate directors
explicitly as ‘trustees,’ contemporary corporate theory
has more or less explicitly moved back to the (original)
notion that a trust relationship exist between the
corporation’s directors/managers and its other
participants and factors of production, and that those trust
171. Id. (quoting TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., No. 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at
*8 n.14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989)).
172. Brudney, supra note 162, at 606. But see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989) (using the economic agency
model to argue that anything voluntary—meaning the ability to enter the transaction or not—is a
contract, and fiduciary duties are merely “free” terms the parties would have bargained for but can
accomplish “costlessly in advance.” Id. at 1428, 1445. Additionally, “the dynamics of the market drive
[managers] to act as if they had investors’ interests at heart. It is almost as if there were an invisible
hand” because “how are members of state legislatures or other alternative rule-givers to do better?”
Id. at 1419, 1432.).
173. René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: The Mechanics of Trusting,
38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 103, 121–22 (2013); cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 89–90 (2004) (“Two conceptions of the business judgment
rule compete in the case law. One treats the rule as a standard of liability. Hence, for example, some
courts and commentators argue that the business judgment rule shields directors from liability so long
as they act in good faith. Others contend that the rule simply raises the liability bar from mere
negligence to, say, gross negligence or recklessness. Alternatively, however, the business judgment
rule can be seen as an abstention doctrine. In this conception, the rule’s presumption of good faith
does not state a standard of liability but rather establishes a presumption against judicial review of
duty of care claims. The court therefore abstains from reviewing the substantive merits of the directors’
conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule’s presumption of good faith.”); see
also Brudney, supra note 162, at 635 (“Judicial review of the board’s decision in terms of ‘business
judgement’ further supports the idea of the discretion available to parties in a ‘mere’ contractual
relationship. While the phenomenon can be explained, it is hard to see how it can be justified.”).
174. 73 A.3d at 43.
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relationships secure and control the fidelity and diligence
of the former with regard to the firm investment interests
of the latter.175
The earlier notion of trust relationships was espoused most notably
by Merrick Dodd,176 who asserted that directors should consider all the
interests of capital, labor, and the public. This is a fiduciary duty. Some
old cases did describe directors as trustees, or having a role in the nature
of trustees, for the corporation and the shareholders—though not strictly a
trustee, mostly because the directors do not hold title.177 For example, in
Stewart v. Harris (and other cases noted in the footnote below):
“. . . Directors and managing officers, in addition to their
functions as mere agents, occupy a double position of
partial trust. They are quasi or sub modo trustees for the
corporation with respect to the corporate property, and
they are quasi or sub modo trustees for the corporation
with respect to the corporate property, and they are quasi
or sub modo trustees for the stockholders with respect to
their shares of the stock.” The Supreme Court of the
United States, in Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616, 22 L.
Ed. 492, declared that “the managers and officers of a
company, where capital is contributed in shares, are in a
very legitimate sense trustees, alike for its stockholders
and its creditors, though they may not be trustees
technically and in form.”178
175. Reich-Graefe, supra note 173, at 117–18. We reject the proposal to create a new layer of
oversight, an “equity trustee,” to oversee the directors, proposed in Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee,
42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717 (2010).
176. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1154–55 (1932) (“That there are three groups of people who have an interest in that institution.
One is the group of fifty-odd thousand people who have put their capital in the company, namely, its
stockholders. Another is a group of well toward one hundred thousand people who are putting their
labor and their lives into the business of the company. The third group is of customers and the general
public.”).
177. See, e.g., Quinn v. Forsyth, 158 S.E.2d 686, 691 (Ga. App. 1967) (“[W]hile a corporate
director does not hold title and is not a strict trustee, ‘he does occupy a fiduciary relation to the
stockholders with reference to their shares of stock, and this relationship obtains when such director
is dealing with an individual stockholder in the purchase of such stockholder’s shares.’” (quoting
Manning v. Wills, 17 S.E.2d 261, 266 (Ga. 1941))).
178. Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277, 280 (Kan. 1904) (first quoting POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 1090) (second quoting Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616, 619 (1874)); see also
Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 233–34 (Ga. 1903); Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 139 P. 879, 888–89 (Ariz.
1913); Atkinson v. Marquart, 541 P.2d 556, 558 (Ariz. 1975); Williams v. Queen Fisheries, Inc., 469
P.2d 583, 585 (Wash. App. 1970) (“Corporate officers and directors occupy a fiduciary relationship
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The conservatorship model is similar to the concept of “mediating
hierarchs,” proposed by Blair and Stout:
who must balance the competing needs and demands of
shareholders, creditors, customers, suppliers, executives,
rank-and-file employees, and even the local
community . . . .
...
In reality, directors simply do not behave the way
the principal-agent model predicts. They reward many
groups with larger slices of the corporate pie when the pie
is growing, and spread the loss among many when the pie
is shrinking. Far from providing evidence that directors
are doing something wrong by imposing ‘agency costs’
on shareholders, this observation suggests directors may
be doing exactly what team production analysis says they
should be doing—acting as mediating hierarchs who
balance the conflicting interests of the many members
who make up a healthy and productive corporate team.179
Bratton also engages the concept of the mediating hierarch’s role,
envisioning a director with the flexibility to adjust between relational
contracts, discrete contracts, various parties, and capable of drawing on
models of trust, agency, contract, and fiduciary principles. “A mediative
conception of the [corporate] law can thus be useful, despite modest
theoretical aspirations. It encourages better understanding of the ‘tough
questions.’ Where two valid, but inconsistent, normative directives come
to bear on a problem, mediation is required.”180 Additionally, Brudney
observes that the economic principal-agency model that presumes selfto a private corporation and shareholders thereof akin to that of a trustee . . . .”); Burt v. Irvine Co., 47
Cal. Rptr. 392, 406 (1965) (“It is hornbook law that directors, while not strictly trustees, are
fiduciaries . . . .” (quoting Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 74 (Cal. App.
1952))).
179. Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note 152, at 738–39.
180. William W. Bratton, Jr., Public Values, Private Business, and U.S. Corporate Fiduciary
Law, in CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHANGING STRUCTURES AND THE DYNAMICS
OF REGULATION 23, 24–25 (Joseph McCahery et al. eds., 1993) (“Corporate law, by accepting
disagreement on norms as an integral part of social and economic life, thereby helps us live with
institutions despite disagreement. Corporate law must encompass entity and contract, fiduciary and
contract, state and contact, trust and agency, self-interest and co-operation, welfare and goodwill,
mandate and facilitation, so as to serve as a nexus of communicative action that contributes to
corporate institutional stability.”) Id. at 33.
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interest and contractual incentives actually reduces the state-imposed
fiduciary duties and allows the agents “to engage in conflicts of interest
transactions or otherwise to serve themselves . . . at the possible expense
of public stockholders.”181
The conservatorship model can also include the interests of other
capital-providing stakeholders, such as stockholders and debt-holders, and
many stakeholders beyond that, such as labor and communities, which is
what both Dodd and Berle wanted in their conceptions of shareholder
rights.
CONCLUSION
The ownership of a large, publicly-traded corporation is typically
quite different from the ownership of a close or private corporation.
Shareholder investment horizons in publicly traded firms are wildly
different, varying from milliseconds to centuries. For a corporate director
to act as an agent of this group of principals does nothing but beg questions
about how it could be done. The answer is this: directors are not agents of
the shareholders but are fiduciaries to the corporation itself, and they are
obliged to manage the corporation in its best interest. The agency theory
of shareholders that developed in the 1970s is not based on—and is, in
fact, contrary to—corporate law. While legal fictions are recognized in the
law, the agency theory was an economic fiction to justify a theory—a
theory that then mutated into doctrine and mandated conformity to the
theory rather than to law and practice. In contrast, Berle’s fiction of
shareholder ownership was to create public benefit for widely held shares
by a large shareholding population. That might still be realized through
the institutional holdings where retirement savings are held, but trying to
ascertain those many, diverse shareholders’ investment time horizons is
unlikely to result in any guidance to directors, and should not provide
guidance for corporate investment decisions.

181. Brudney, supra note 163, at 623.

